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F OREWORD
The agri-food chain today is significantly different from that of
twenty years ago. Changing consumer demands, knowledge inten-
sive technology, North American integration and globalization
have all contributed to the evolution of the different segments of
the chain, which include input suppliers, agricultural producers,
food processors, and food distributors.
This report is part of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC)’s
Performance Report Series. The purpose of this series is to create a
picture of the competitiveness and profitability of the entire agri-
food value chain to support a more informal discussion on changes
in the agri-food value chain, and the challenges and opportunities
it faces in the future. This information will provide a reference
point for determining the preparedness of the agri-food value
chain to take maximum advantage of the new Agricultural Policy
Framework (APF) to build a more profitable future.
This report looks at traceability in the meat and livestock sector. As
industry and government work together in developing traceability
capacity, this report asks the question: ‘What is meant by traceabil-
ity?’ The answer to this question has huge implications for the
design of the traceability system. Traceability systems can vary
from simple traceback systems to systems that provide identity
preservation and quality assurances. Using experimental auctions
of beef and ham sandwiches to estimate consumers’ willingness to
pay, this reports finds that while consumers are willing to pay non-
trivial amounts just for traceability capacity, traceability is much
more valuable to them when coupled with assurances with
respect to superior food safety standards, or on-farm produc-
tion practices (e.g., humane animal treatment). However,
many of the traceability systems that are currently being put
in place, for e.g., the Canadian national cattle identifica-
tion system, are only designed to facilitate the traceback
of products in the event of a food safety problem. While
these simple traceback schemes can play an impor-









impact of a foodborne disease problem, the results of this report
show that they might be of more value to consumers if they were
also coupled with food safety and quality assurances.Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector xi
E XECUTIVE  SUMMARY
Given the interest in traceability, as evidenced by the public policy
and private sector initiatives under way in different countries, it is
timely to ask what is really meant by traceability and what are the
expected economic benefits from traceability? Traceability is some-
times used to refer to simple traceback systems but has also been
applied to programs that provide identity preservation and quality
assurances throughout the supply chain. Traceability can be part of
a strategy to reduce the risks or minimize the impact of a food-
borne disease problem. It can also be part of a larger quality assur-
ance strategy, facilitating the verification of specific quality
attributes. This report examines the economic incentives for imple-
menting traceability systems in the Canadian meat and livestock
sector.
A variety of approaches to livestock and meat traceability have
been adopted in different countries. These include industry-wide
private sector initiatives, individual supply chain initiatives and
public sector regulation. Some systems enable complete traceabil-
ity from the retail package back to the farm production unit,
whereas others provide limited traceability between specific
stages, such as packer to producer. There are systems that provide
simple traceback capability versus those that bundle traceability
with additional meat quality or credence attribute assurances. It is
therefore pertinent to ask: what do we really mean by traceabil-
ity? Clearly a range of different systems exist, yet most of them
claim to be traceability systems. While they all incorporate
some degree of traceability, some offer much more in the
form of quality or food safety assurances.
Three separate functions of a livestock and meat tracea-
bility system are identified. The first is a reactive func-
tion, which allows the traceback of products or animals
through the supply chain in the event of a food safety
problem. This describes the livestock traceability
systems in place in most countries, including
Member States of the EU and Canada. These live-
stock traceability programs enable ex post cost
reduction after a problem has arisen. The second


















effectiveness of Tort Liability law as an incentive for firms to pro-
duce safe food. A third function of traceability is to reduce infor-
mation costs for consumers through labelling the presence of
credence attributes, including those related to food safety, animal
welfare, environmentally-friendly production practices, etc. This is
an ex ante information function requiring proactive information
provision and quality verification.
In reducing consumer information asymmetry, the challenge is to
transform credence attributes into search attributes through identi-
fication and labelling. This requires ex ante provision (verification)
of information on process attributes rather than simple traceback
capability from retail back to the farm. The question “What do con-
sumers really want?” lies at the heart of this issue. In other words,
is traceability information useful to consumers? To address these
questions, experimental auctions were used to assess the willing-
ness to pay of Canadian consumers for a traceability assurance, a
food safety assurance and an on-farm production method assur-
ance for beef and ham.
The results of the experimental auctions suggest that respondents
were willing to pay non-trivial amounts for a traceability assur-
ance, although these results are stronger for beef than for pork.
However, quality assurances with respect to food safety and on-
farm production methods for beef were more valuable to consum-
ers than a simple traceability assurance. Bundling traceability with
these additional assurances yielded significantly more value to
consumers than traceability alone, with the economic value of
those additional assurances appearing to be higher for beef than
for pork.
While traceability is clearly of some value to some consumers,
traceability, by itself may not be enough. Traceability bundled
with quality assurances with respect to specific credence attributes
has more appeal. Ex post reactive traceability systems perform
important economic functions in limiting the public and private
costs from a food safety problem and in maintaining consumer
confidence in an industry, however, they do little to reduce con-
sumer information asymmetry. Traceability may be a necessary
but not sufficient condition for ex ante verification of quality
attributes.
If the objective is to reduce consumer information asymmetry with
respect to quality assurances, “traceability” may be the wrong
word to apply. It implies an ex post reactive process of tracing
something to the source of origin, rather than ex ante provision of
information on process attributes that verifies product quality. The
research conducted for this report indicates that Canadian con-
sumers are likely to place a higher value on quality verification


















quality assurances, than on traceability alone. Future economic
analysis of the role of traceability systems in improving food safety
and food quality should distinguish between ex ante information
provision and ex post traceability functions.Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector 1
C HAPTER 1
I NTRODUCTION
Consumers have become more discerning in their food consumption choices. Food safety and
food quality are the focus of industry strategies, policy initiatives and consumer concerns in
many countries. A variety of private sector and public policy traceability initiatives have
emerged around the world, partly with the objective of reducing consumer information asym-
metry with respect to food safety and food quality attributes. In Canada, traceability of food and
food ingredients through different levels of the agri-food chain has featured in recent industry
initiatives and in policy discussions within the Agricultural Policy Framework (APF). Traceabil-
ity can be part of a strategy to reduce the risks or minimize the impact of a foodborne disease
problem. It can also be part of a larger quality assurance strategy, facilitating the verification of
specific quality attributes.
This report examines the economic incentives for implementing traceability systems in the meat
and livestock sector, distinguishing between ex post traceback systems and ex ante quality verifi-
cation systems. Examples of voluntary private sector and public sector traceability programs are
discussed. Experimental auctions are used to assess the willingness to pay of Canadian consum-
ers for a traceability assurance, a food safety assurance and an on-farm production method
assurance for meat products. Results from these laboratory market experiments and additional
survey data provide insights into the relative value of traceability and quality verification assur-
ances and the credibility of different information sources for providing quality assurances to
consumers.
Food safety and food quality as motivators for traceability
A series of high profile food safety incidences has heightened public awareness of food safety
over the past decade. For example the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in the
United Kingdom’s (UK) beef industry; outbreaks of E. coli O157:H7 infections attributed to
ground beef in the U.S. (Jack-in-the-Box; Tyson meats); the deaths of 22 senior citizens in Scot-
land linked to E. coli O157:H7 contaminated meat purchased from a local butchers shop; the con-
tamination of Belgian animal feed with potentially cancerous dioxins in 1999; the ‘Garibaldi’
incident in Australia in 1995 in which E. coli O157:H7 from a contaminated meat sausage resulted
in several illnesses and the death of a child (Hobbs et al., 2001).
The increased emphasis on food quality is partly supply driven, as a result of technological
changes and increased product differentiation possibilities. It is also partly demand driven, with
increased consumer interest in a wider array of intrinsic and extrinsic food attributes. Intrinsic
quality attributes include palatability, nutrition, the functional (health) properties of food, etc.
Extrinsic quality attributes include elements of the production environment, such as farm animal










that cannot be detected by consumers without a quality signal, such as a label. Often the same is
true of food safety. Unless severe product deterioration has occurred, consumers cannot detect
food safety hazards through sensory means prior to purchase. Occasionally food safety can be an
experience attribute if a consumer experiences a food borne illness immediately following con-
sumption of a specific food item. Usually, food safety has credence attribute properties. This was
the case for BSE in the UK beef industry – it was impossible for a consumer to know whether he/
she had consumed BSE-infected beef even after consumption
1.
Consumers incur information costs in determining whether experience or credence attributes are
present. Market failure can arise as a result of information asymmetry if the market adversely
selects lower quality (or unsafe) food in the absence of information signals to consumers. In other
words, if consumers cannot distinguish between “low quality” (unsafe) food and “high quality”
(safe) food, there will be uncertainty regarding the safety of any given food product, which will
be reflected in a lower willingness-to-pay for all similar foods. At lower prices there is a reduced
incentive for producers of food to invest the necessary resources in producing safer food (e.g.
increased microbial testing, improved sanitation procedures, employee training and monitoring,
etc.). Lower cost (lower quality/less safe) food will “chase” higher cost (higher quality/safer)
food from the market.
A similar argument applies to credence quality attributes, such as GM food, animal welfare
friendly or environmentally friendly food. However, whether consumers perceive the credence
attribute as a negative attribute or a positive attribute affects the market incentives for firms to
signal quality information accurately. The role of information asymmetry and product quality
has been explored extensively in the economics literature and serves as a basis for the discussion
of traceability systems that follows.
Grossman (1981) finds that when ex post verification is costless and there are negligible commu-
nications costs between consumers, even a monopolist has an incentive to voluntarily and truth-
fully disclose product quality ex ante. Due to adverse selection, sellers of high quality products
have an incentive to disclose true quality; therefore nondisclosure implies low quality. Grossman
extends his model to consider the role of warranties when quality can be determined through
ex post observation or use. He concludes that there is no role for government intervention to
encourage quality disclosure if (and only if) disclosure is costless.
In an analysis of the incentives for voluntary approaches to food safety versus mandatory regu-
lation, Segerson (1999) uses a game theoretic model to show the conditions under which a firm
would adopt voluntary food safety standards, given the threat of mandatory standards being
imposed. She finds that the market is likely to work well to induce voluntary adoption of food
safety measures for search and experience goods but not for credence goods. However, the
threat of government regulatory action or publicly funded inducements (subsidies) may still be
sufficient to induce voluntary food safety measures provided that the regulator is prepared to
follow through to ensure that it is a credible threat.
McCluskey (2000) discusses information asymmetry and the role of policy in the case of organic
foods. She shows that due to the credence nature of the good, a profit-maximizing producer will
gain from deceiving consumers with false quality claims. Repeat-purchase relationships and
third party monitoring are necessary for efficient markets in high quality credence goods. Stand-
1. New-variant Creutzfeld-Jacob Disease (nv-CJD) in humans, which is thought to be caused by consuming BSE infected beef,
has an incubation period of several years. Thus, symptoms do not emerge for several years after consumption has occurred













ardization of label claims and public sector certification may improve market efficiency. Tracea-
bility systems facilitate the provision of quality signals to consumers. Yet (as discussed below),
the primary function of many of the emerging livestock traceability systems is to reduce the risks
and costs of a food safety problem rather than to provide credible ex ante quality signals to con-
sumers. The credibility of quality assurances delivered through traceability systems is also exam-
ined in this report.Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector 5
C HAPTER 2
T RACEABILITY  SYSTEMS  IN  MEAT 
AND  LIVESTOCK  SECTORS
Reflecting the growing interest in meat traceability, a number of livestock identification and
meat traceability systems have emerged in various countries in recent years. Most of these are
private sector systems, although there are also examples of public sector regulatory initiatives to
mandate livestock traceability. Some systems have partial traceability capabilities, facilitating
traceability between specific stages of the supply chain (e.g. point of slaughter back to farm of
origin), whereas others offer full traceability from the retail counter back to the farm. This section
discusses recent examples of private and public sector traceability initiatives enabling partial and
full traceability.
Private sector traceability initiatives
Voluntary labelling by firms, sometimes supplemented by third party certification, can identify
credence attributes. If there is a market premium for “safer” food, there is an incentive for firms
producing products with enhanced levels of food safety to identify this attribute in a label. Irra-
diated meat products in the U.S. are a good example. A credible monitoring and enforcement
mechanism is necessary to reduce the risk of cheating through mislabelling. A self-policing
industry quality assurance or safety labelling program could be effective if those firms produc-
ing “high quality” (or demonstrably safer) food are able to censure those firms who free-ride on
the certification program through false or misleading labelling. In the absence of an effective self-
policing mechanism, the market failure problem persists for products with negative quality or
safety attributes. A firm will not voluntarily disclose low quality.
Is there a competitive advantage to firms in offering a food safety guarantee that allows them to
capture rents from the marketplace by differentiating their products on the basis of safety? This
is a contentious issue. On one hand, it can be argued that a safe food supply is a basic expectation
of all consumers, therefore premiums for “safe food” do not exist. Others argue that it may be
possible for firms to market “food safety” by differentiating their products on the basis of safety
(Roberts et al. 1997). This strategy may provide a first-mover advantage even if the food safety
standard becomes an implicit expectation of consumers if a firm is the first to offer this guaran-
tee. In the UK, for example, Lion brand eggs differentiated their product on the basis of food
safety with a claim that the eggs are Salmonella-free because the hens that produced them were
vaccinated against Salmonella.
Private sector traceability initiatives in the livestock sector include individual supply chain initi-
atives and industry-wide programs. Supply chain partnerships delivering traceability have
emerged in the UK beef industry, largely as a result of the loss in consumer confidence following
the BSE crisis. One example is Tracesafe, a small farmer-owned company that developed a net-










production protocols specified the purchase of feed from a set of contracted feed mills and
included an extensive system of on-farm record keeping. Tracesafe differentiated its beef on the
basis of the ability to trace the history of individual meat cuts to the animal of origin, with an
implied safety assurance. Using an extensive system of record keeping and operating within a
closed supply chain, Tracesafe was able to trace the history of individual meat cuts to the animal
of origin. Independent auditing of the system was carried out regularly. Marketing was targeted
at specialist retail outlets and high quality restaurants where consumers were willing to pay a
premium for the assurance of guaranteed traceability. The brand name, Tracesafe, was stamped
on all accredited beef carcasses both to help prevent fraud and act as an endorsement of the
traceability system (Fearne, 1998).
The Canadian meat processing sector has recognized the potential role of traceability in bolster-
ing consumer confidence in food safety, and as a product differentiation strategy. Michael
McCain, President and CEO of Maple Leaf Foods Inc. (a major Canadian pork and poultry proc-
essor) is quoted as referring to traceability as the “holy grail of the food supply chain” (Powell,
2002). Maple Leaf is currently funding the development of DNA identification technology to
facilitate the traceback of meat to the farm of origin (Powell, 2002). Pressure from export markets,
particularly the Japanese market, appears to be a significant driver for this development.
Food retailers can be a catalyst for improved traceability, if it can reduce their risk exposure,
improve product recall effectiveness or reduce the transaction costs of monitoring product qual-
ity including supplier production methods. UK supermarkets require their beef suppliers to be
members of accredited quality assurance programs, although the meat may not be traceable to
the specific farm of origin. The Canadian retailer Sobeys reportedly requires its suppliers to dem-
onstrate that specific production, processing, transport and handling processes have been imple-
mented. While traceability back to the farm may not be an explicit requirement, it can be a
necessary condition for providing information on production and processing methods (Hobbs,
1996; Fearne, 1998; Bredahl et al. 2001). These are supply chain management motivations for
traceability from the retail sector back down the food chain. However, this does not necessarily
mean that traceability information would be made available to consumers on retail packages.
The motivation is usually to reduce transaction costs of supply chain management rather than to
provide information to consumers on credence attributes.
Industry associations or producer groups have introduced industry-wide traceability programs.
The Canadian Cattlemen’s Association established the Canadian Cattle Identification Agency
(CCIA) in 2001. The CCIA implemented a national cattle identification system to facilitate the
traceback of cattle in the event of a food safety problem, which became mandatory in July 2002.
The industry initiated CCIA as a risk reduction strategy. Prior to the introduction of the trace-
back system, the identification and tracing of Canadian cattle in the event of a major crisis on the
scale of BSE would have been virtually impossible.
Cattle leaving the herd of origin are issued a unique ID number displayed on a CCIA tag with a
barcode. Tags are distributed by authorized service centres that record which ID numbers are
allocated to which producers. The unique ID number is maintained to the point of carcass
inspection in the packing plant. The monetary penalty for non-compliance ranges from $100-
$450 for non-commercial violations and $500-$6000 for commercial violations (CFIA, 2000a;
2000b). The system is enforced by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), which in the
case of a serious violation that poses significant health or animal health risks, can prosecute






















In the event of a food safety problem, the CFIA initiates a traceback procedure using information
from the CCIA database to identify the last location of the animal and the herd of origin (CCIA,
2002). This information is used to track cattle movements both backwards and forwards in the
supply chain. Producers are not required to maintain records. In this regard the Canadian sys-
tem is quite different from the “cattle passport” system in the UK. The UK system requires pro-
ducers to register all cattle from birth and record all movements on or off a farm with the
national identification agency. In the UK system the unique animal ID number allows immediate
identification of all farms on which the cattle have been located. The Canadian system only
allows direct identification of the herd of origin and the final location of the cattle, with traceback
beyond those two points relying on the ability of producers to provide this information.
The CCIA explain that a national cattle identification system was needed in Canada to maintain
consumer confidence and market share:
If a health or safety issue were to happen in Canada, over half of our production
could suddenly be without a market. We need to do what we can today to ensure
market access, both domestically and internationally. A National Identification
Program will help protect our markets. . . . If we as an industry do not put into
place our own national identification system, we will lose market share and may
find a system not of our choosing imposed upon us (CCIA, 2002).
National livestock identification systems are also being used as a springboard for more extensive
quality assurance programs. Australia introduced a voluntary National Livestock Identification
System (NLIS) as a joint industry/government initiative. Cattle are identified using devices
embedded with an electronic microchip. The identification may be through an ear tag or a rumen
bolus. The information on the chip can be read electronically and is stored on a national data-
base. The system goes beyond simple identification however, and allows the storage of informa-
tion on disease and residue status of the animal, market eligibility and other commercial
information. Cattle producers can access individual animal information through the database,
linking it back to their own farm records on feed performance, genetics and management tech-
niques (Meat and Livestock Australia, 2001).
An Australian quality assurance system including DNA sampling for traceback piggybacks on
the NLIS. It is essentially a series of quality management protocols that cover production, han-
dling and processing. These protocols are called Cattle Care. A National Vendor Declaration
form identifies the seller and provides basic production information (e.g. whether the cattle were
treated with a growth-promoting hormone, information about the feeding program, etc.). This
information, combined with the NLIS cattle tag, enables the traceback of cattle in the event of a
problem (Lawrence, 2002).
A voluntary grading system, Meat Standards Australia (MSA), uses a series of pre and post-
slaughter measures to predict the eating quality of meat. Blood samples are taken from each car-
cass that qualifies for the MSA program while the carcass can still be identified with a seller. If a
consumer complains of a bad eating experience from MSA-graded meat, a DNA sample from the
meat can be matched with the blood sample from the carcass. In this way, meat cuts can be
traced through the supply chain and to the farm of origin. Although there is a food safety ele-
ment, the traceback in the MSA system is focused primarily on eating quality. It can assist in
identifying where improvements may be necessary or in identifying sellers who consistently










The Australian identification and quality assurance systems are voluntary. They establish the
information infrastructure onto which individual supply chains can bolt their own quality
branded beef programs. There are several examples of Australian branded beef programs that
use the MSA system as part of a product differentiation strategy (Lawrence, 2002).
Regulatory traceability initiatives
Mandatory traceability and labelling initiatives have been introduced in some jurisdictions. In
1997, the European Union (EU) introduced a regulation establishing rules for beef labelling sys-
tems in Member States
2. There are three components to the regulation.  First, each Member State
will have a national cattle identification and registration system.  Second, beef products will be
labelled with a traceability number identifying origin, including where the animals from which
the meat was derived were born, reared, slaughtered and processed. Third, the regulation
introduces rules for voluntary labelling with additional information (e.g. production
information, animal welfare information, etc.). Individual Member States of the EU have
introduced additional voluntary beef labelling systems.  A few of the labelling schemes are more
extensive than simply indicating the origin of the cattle and include, for example, animal welfare
information, the breed of the animal or the method of fattening.  Third country labelling systems
for beef imported into the EU are subject to the approval of the European Commission (EC).
The EU beef labelling and traceability regulation represents a more extensive regulatory involve-
ment in meat traceability than is evident in many other countries. Stanford et al. (2001) indicate
that 25 countries are at varying stages of implementing individual animal identification pro-
grams, ranging from basic systems such as those developed by the CCIA in Canada, to more
complex passport programs, as in the UK, that directly track an animal throughout its life. In
some cases, the public sector role is limited to developing and enforcing a national cattle identifi-
cation system, rather than requiring full traceability labelling throughout the supply chain.
In Mexico, the Ministry of Agriculture is working with livestock associations to develop a
national record of brands, tattoos and other permanent livestock markings for identifying live-
stock. A 1999 law moved responsibility for maintaining records of livestock markings to state
offices of the Ministry of Agriculture. This was previously handled by municipalities and local
livestock associations. The federal ministry of agriculture will keep a national record of livestock
associations and their respective registered markings (Food Traceability Report Weekly, 2002).
This system falls short of a national cattle identification and tracking system and instead appears
to be aimed at distinguishing between breeds and regional production areas.
Following the loss of its European markets for beef following an outbreak of foot-and-mouth dis-
ease in 2001, Argentina has scrambled to put in place a livestock traceability system. In mid-2002,
Argentinian legislators considered a Bill to create a national commission for cattle identification
and meat traceability. The existing Argentinian system had been criticised for being duplicative
and overly burdensome on the industry, with separate approaches for traceability of organic
products, cattle in feedlots, cattle destined for the EU market and traceability for disease control
purposes. The proposal for an overhaul of these procedures in the Argentinian beef industry
included the potential to develop a genetic tracking system that could be used with a conven-
tional barcode identification system to track animals and meat through each stage of production,
processing and distribution (Lewis, 2002). The cost effectiveness of such a system and its poten-
tial to re-open and maintain access to key export markets has not been determined.






















In July 2001, New Zealand introduced a compulsory identification system for all livestock and
domesticated deer, which includes a declaration card detailing where and when the animals
were born (Thornton, 2002). A voluntary DNA tracking system builds on the compulsory live-
stock identification system. Processors keep a DNA sample of every animal slaughtered. Packs
of meat destined for export have identification information on the farm of origin and slaughter-
house, enabling tracking from the retail counter back through the supply chain. A recent test of
this system successfully traced a package of New Zealand lamb chops from a supermarket in the
UK through the UK importing networks, the New Zealand export and transportation system, the
packing plant and back to the farm on which the lambs were born (Thornton, 2002). In New Zea-
land the basic livestock identification system - with traceability from the packing plant back to
the farm - is mandated by law. However, the DNA component of the system enabling full tracea-
bility throughout the supply chain is market driven – unlike in the EU where full traceability in
the beef sector is mandated by the beef labelling regulation 
The 2002 U.S. Farm Bill introduced retail-level country of origin labelling for beef, lamb, pork,
fish, fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables and peanuts. In the interim this is voluntary but a
mandatory regulation will be established by September 30, 2004. To receive a U.S. country of ori-
gin designation livestock must be born, raised and slaughtered in the U.S. Mandatory country of
origin labelling has ramifications for the traceability, record keeping and information systems
that will be required in order to substantiate the “born, reared and slaughtered” claim for any
meat products (Hobbs, 2002; Buhr, 2002).
To summarize, there are many approaches to enhancing traceability in the livestock sectors.
These include industry-wide private sector initiatives, individual supply chain initiatives and
public sector regulation. They can involve complete traceability from the retail package back to
the farm production unit or limited traceability between specific stages, such as packer to pro-
ducer. There are systems that provide simple traceback capability versus those that bundle trace-
ability with additional meat quality or credence attribute assurances. This raises the pertinent
question of what do we really mean by traceability? Clearly a range of different systems exist, yet
most of them claim to be traceability systems. While they all incorporate some degree of tracea-
bility, some offer much more in the form of quality or food safety assurances. The next section
examines the functions of traceability in the meat and livestock sector and the economic incen-
tives for putting traceability systems in place.Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector 11
C HAPTER 3
E CONOMIC  INCENTIVES  FOR 
TRACEABILITY  SYSTEMS
Given the interest in traceability, as evidenced by the public policy and private sector initiatives
under way in different countries, it is timely to ask what is really meant by traceability and what
are its expected economic benefits? Traceability is sometimes used to refer to simple traceback
systems but has also been applied to programs that provide identity preservation and quality
assurances throughout the supply chain. A review of the recent literature reveals a number of
potential motivations for traceability in the meat and livestock sector.
Liddell and Bailey (2001) make a useful distinction between traceability, transparency and qual-
ity assurance. They define traceability as the ability to track inputs used to make food products
backward through the supply chain to their source. Transparency is the public disclosure of
information on the rules, procedures and practices used to produce a food product as it moves
through the supply chain. Quality assurance includes a range of practices aimed specifically at
enhancing food safety or quality, including hygiene practices, quality grading and measurement
and the ability for product recalls.
Golan et al. (2002) identify three private sector motivations for establishing traceability systems,
including differentiating products with credence attributes, facilitating traceback for food safety
and quality, and cost reductions and enhanced inventory control through improving supply-side
logistics management. They also identify government incentives for mandated traceability
including: the ability to monitor traceback to enhance food safety; to correct market failures from
consumer information asymmetry with respect to credence attributes (a consumer right-to-know
argument); and to protect consumers from fraud or producers from unfair competition through
mislabelled products or unsubstantiated claims with respect to credence attributes (e.g. organic
food labels).
In an analysis of traceability in the UK livestock sector, Pettitt (2001) identifies a variety of pur-
poses that are more regulatory in focus than those of Golan et al. The effects of the BSE crisis and
the recent foot and mouth disease crisis in the UK livestock industry likely influence this list of
perceived benefits. According to Pettitt, traceability of livestock and food serves a number of
purposes including: the protection of animal health; the protection of public health (food recall,
enforcement of drug withdrawal periods); protection of both animal and human health from
zoonotic diseases (such as tuberculosis, salmonella and BSE); the protection of animal welfare
through the enforcement of standards; and the protection of taxpayer investments through the










Ex post cost reduction through traceback
Traceability systems can be introduced for a wide variety of reasons. Identifying the economic
incentives for introducing traceability systems is useful in understanding the extent to which
traceability is likely to deliver net economic benefits. For the purposes of this analysis, three sep-
arate functions of a livestock and meat traceability system are identified. The first is a reactive
function, which allows the traceback of products or animals through the supply chain in the
event of a food safety problem. This describes the livestock traceability systems in place in most
countries, including Member States of the EU and Canada. They enable ex post cost reduction
after a problem has arisen.
Effective traceback may enable the scope of a food borne illness to be contained, thereby reduc-
ing public costs (e.g. medical costs, lost productivity, etc.) by limiting the number of people
exposed to potentially unsafe food. By identifying and isolating a source of contamination, a
traceability system can also reduce private costs to the industry, reducing product recall costs
through more targeted recalls and protecting firms who practice due diligence from free riders
who fail to invest in good production practices. An effective traceability system may also help to
maintain public confidence and maintain access to export markets in the event of a food safety
problem if the source can be identified and isolated quickly. Most livestock traceability pro-
grams, for example, the Canadian cattle identification system perform this reactive function.
They enable ex post cost reduction after a problem has arisen, as such, they are a risk reduction
tool for the industry.
Strengthening liability incentives
The second function of a traceability system is to enhance the effectiveness of Tort Liability law
as an incentive for firms to produce safe food. The threat of civil legal action and the resulting
financial damages and damage to brand name capital provide the incentive. To the extent that
industry-wide traceability systems can facilitate the establishment of legal liability, the incentive
for firms to adopt measures that enhance food safety is strengthened. In this sense, traceability
systems also perform an ex post information function. Traceability also reduces the monitoring
and enforcement costs for consumers and downstream food distributors in identifying the party
at fault and in seeking legal redress.
Reducing information costs for consumers
A third function of traceability is to reduce information costs for consumers through labelling the
presence of credence attributes, including those related to food safety, animal welfare, environ-
mentally-friendly production practices, etc. This is an ex ante information function requiring
proactive information provision and quality verification. However, most livestock identification
and traceability systems and the EU beef traceability and labelling regulation are reactive in
nature. They are ex post information systems – in the event of a problem, they allow the traceback
of the product. However, they do not facilitate the ex ante provision of information on product
attributes necessary to reduce consumers’ information asymmetry.
Paradoxically, the frequent justification for introducing mandatory traceability and labelling,
such as the EU beef labelling regulation, is the provision of useful information to consumers that





















mented beef labelling regulations. Initial experiences suggest that this is an ex post, reactive label-
ling system rather than an ex ante information system that would reduce consumer information
asymmetry with respect to important credence attributes.
Other Member States report that their consumers, even when well informed, have
not notably changed their patterns of consumption of beef (Commission of the
European Communities, 1999, p.7)
This statement suggests these countries introduced ex post reactive labelling systems, rather than
ex ante systems that provided information on credence attributes of importance to consumers.
Further, it appears that this regulation raised the transaction costs of vertical supply chain rela-
tionships in some Member States:
Denmark, France, Austria and the United Kingdom indicate that the increased
administrative and control procedures arising from beef labelling have reduced
the ease with which operators can trade freely between themselves and has made
management of meat supplies more problematical (sic) and bureaucratized.
(Commission of the European Communities, p.7).
A comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of these labelling regulations, including implications for
vertical coordination and an assessment of whether the labels provide information of value to
consumers, was not conducted:
Finally, Member States reserved their strongest comments for their assessment of
the high costs associated with the current labelling legislation and the heavy
administrative burden placed on both the public and the private sector. They do
admit, however, to having few criteria or independent market studies for judging
if the policy has been cost-effective. (Commission of the European Communities,
p.7).
It is apparent that the EU regulation, although appearing to offer ex ante information on beef
products, is in fact an ex post traceability system. In the event of a problem, it will facilitate the
traceback of beef products and affected livestock but it does little to provide consumers with
ex ante product quality information.
Instead, a more important role for a regulator may be in establishing credible third party moni-
toring and verification of ex ante quality claims. The challenge is to transform the credence
attributes into search attributes through identification and labelling. This requires ex ante provi-
sion (verification) of information on process attributes. The question “What do consumers really
want?” lies at the heart of this issue. In other words, is traceability information useful to consum-
ers? If so, is the absence of traceability information an indication of market failure and therefore a
justification for mandatory traceability and labelling programs to correct the market failure? Or
can voluntary traceability labels be a useful product differentiation strategy for individual firms
or supply chain alliances? Before we can begin to answer these questions, we need a better
understanding of consumer responses to traceability and quality verification information, and
we need to recognise the breadth of traceability systems than can exist. A taxonomy of traceabil-
ity, identity preservation and quality assurance systems is presented below. This is followed by
an analysis of consumer preferences for simple traceability versus quality assurances that relate
to specific food safety and production practices.Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector 15
C HAPTER 4
T AXONOMY  OF  TRACEABILITY 
SYSTEMS
Table 1 assesses the nature of the information problem and the role (if any) of traceability/iden-
tity preservation systems for a number of food quality and food safety attributes. The taxonomy
illustrates the diverse information needs and differing roles of potential traceability systems.
Each example is identified by the broad classification to which it belongs. A positive or negative
attribute for (some) consumers indicates the extent to which firms have an incentive to voluntar-
ily disclose product quality information – although not whether this disclosure is “honest”. If the
firm does not know the true product quality an incomplete information problem exists. Different
degrees of information asymmetry exist for consumers depending on whether the attribute has
search, experience or credence properties. While consumers are not able to detect credence
attributes, third party testing may reveal them in some cases (e.g. GMOs, residues). Benefits to
the firm from cheating by misrepresenting or mislabelling food is important if ex post monitoring
cannot accurately assess product quality (or safety); this has implications for the establishment of
legal liability. Also, market failure is greater in these situations. Finally, the table identifies the
relevant traceability or identity preservation system and its purpose.
For intrinsic quality characteristics with experience properties, such as palatability, private sector
branding mechanisms serve as a quality signal to consumers and an industry-wide traceability
system is not relevant. Process attributes such as whether the product was produced in an ani-
mal welfare friendly or environmentally friendly manner create an information asymmetry
problem for consumers and are not detectable ex post by a third party monitor. Cheating through
misrepresentation (false labelling) is a problem given the potential returns to a profit-maximiz-
ing firm
3.  An ex ante traceability or quality verification system may solve this information
problem.  In the absence of negative health outcomes or ex post quality measurement, legal
liability is not relevant or cannot be established.
Attributes with immediate food safety effects, such as E.coli are detectable by consumers ex post
(an ensuing illness). An ex post traceability system reduces negative externality effects, e.g. by
tracing and removing potentially contaminated batches from the market, thereby reducing the
number of individuals affected. It facilitates assignment of liability, inducing firms to adopt
measures that reduce the probability of contamination occurring.
Attributes with uncertain long-run food safety outcomes include BSE. Unlike foodborne patho-
gens that result in (relatively) immediate illness, negative health consequences may only emerge
after several years. Even third party testing is not able to identify the presence of the attribute
4.
An ex post traceability system may reduce negative externality effects by enabling potentially










infected source herds to be identified. Producer-to-consumer externalities are reduced if contam-
inated meat is removed from the food chain. Producer-to-producer externalities are reduced for
producers with BSE-free herds if they are protected against a general loss of consumer confi-
dence. Cheating may occur if products can be misrepresented as originating from “assured”
BSE-free herds (i.e. those with no recent cases of the disease). Given the time lag discussed ear-
lier, direct liability for BSE-contaminated meat is unlikely.
Table 1 is not intended to be an exhaustive list; instead it emphasizes the multidimensional
nature of information problems related to food safety and food quality. It also indicates that for
some food attributes, an ex post traceability system may be appropriate to resolve any market
failures, while for others, an ex ante system is more suitable. In some cases, the potential informa-
tion asymmetry or externality problems suggest that both an ex ante and an ex post traceability
system is required.
4. While it may be possible to identify BSE-infected animals in the advanced stages of the disease post-slaughter through exami-
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C HAPTER 5
C ONSUMER  ATTITUDES  TO  TRACE-
ABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCES
Recognising that traceability is a multifaceted concept and can encompass both ex post cost
reduction through traceback and ex ante information provision on credence attributes, we now
turn to the question “what do consumers really want?” Is traceability information, by itself, of
value to consumers or should traceability systems incorporate additional quality assurances?
To investigate Canadian consumer attitudes to traceability, food safety and quality assurances in
the food supply chain, a series of consumer panels were conducted in Saskatchewan and Ontario
in 2002. The panels enabled data collection on willingness to pay (WTP) for traceability, food
safety and on-farm production information on meat products. Additional information was gath-
ered on consumers’ awareness of and concern for food safety, for on-farm production methods
and the level of trust in public and private sector sources of information about production meth-
ods. The following sections present an analysis of the Canadian consumer panel research.
Consumer panel sample recruitment
The primary objective of the consumer panels was to conduct a series of experimental auctions to
evaluate WTP for traceability, food safety and on-farm production information for beef and
ham
5. In the absence of publicly available market data on the demand for traceability and quality
verification characteristics, experimental auctions provide a means of eliciting non-hypothetical
bid data for these characteristics. The experimental auctions were conducted in Saskatoon, Sas-
katchewan and Guelph, Ontario. Saskatchewan participants (106) were recruited from a range of
demographic groups at the University of Saskatchewan (faculty, students, professional, adminis-
trative and maintenance staff). Campus-wide emails, flyers and class announcements were used
to recruit participants for the Saskatchewan panels. Ontario participants (98) were recruited from
the consumer database of a private consumer research firm. Participants were provided with a
minimum of information during recruitment to reduce the risk of sample selection bias – they
were told they would be participating in an economic decision making experiment and would be
provided with a light lunch consisting of a beef (or ham) sandwich. The University of Saskatch-
ewan Ethics Committee on Behavioural Research approved the recruitment methods, experi-
ment design and surveys. Auctions were run with ham and beef at both locations, with
104 people participating in the beef auctions and 100 in the ham auctions.
5. The experimental auction research was carried out in collaboration with DeeVon Bailey and David Dickinson from Utah
State University who were conducting consumer panels in the U.S., the UK, Japan and Canada on a USDA-funded study
(Dickinson and Bailey, 2002). Funding from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada enabled additional data collection to expand










A complete demographic breakdown of the sample is available in Appendix A. Overall, the Sas-
katchewan sample had a higher proportion of males and tended to be younger on average. There
was a range of education levels among the participants, although the higher education levels
tended to be more heavily represented. Relative to the Saskatchewan group, a higher proportion
of Ontario respondents had some college and an undergraduate degree, whereas a lower pro-
portion had a graduate degree. This is to be expected given that the Saskatchewan sample was
drawn from a university population, albeit from a broad cross-section of employees and stu-
dents. Income distribution was similar across the participants in both provinces, although Sas-
katchewan had a higher proportion of respondents in the lower income groups.
Experiment design
The consumer panels were run in groups of 12-14 people. Participants were given a beef (or ham)
sandwich as part of a light lunch, and had the opportunity to bid to exchange their sandwich for
a sandwich with additional verifiable characteristics. Four alternative sandwiches were used in
the auction, with different information available for each sandwich: (i) animal welfare assurance,
(ii) extra food safety assurance, (iii) meat that was traceable to the farm of origin, and; (iv) a sand-
wich that combined all three attributes. Participants were paid $20 as an incentive for attending
the session, which usually lasted about one hour. The sandwich descriptions provided to partici-
pants are included in Appendix B.
The Vickrey second-price auction for the Canadian experiments was consistent with the format
used by Dickinson and Bailey (2002) in their comparable experiments for the U.S., the UK and
Japan. Previous experimental auctions to measure WTP have also used this format, e.g., Shogren
et al. (1994). The auction is designed so that the rational strategy for each participant is to bid
his/her true marginal value for the auction sandwich. In a series of ten rounds, bids were col-
lected for each auction sandwich. Participants bid the amount (if any) they would be willing to
pay to exchange their sandwich for each auction sandwich. Individual bids were private infor-
mation, written down by participants and collected by monitors. At the beginning of each bid-
ding round, the second highest bid (“market price”) for that sandwich from the previous round
was announced. Conducting multiple rounds of bidding and announcing the market price
allows for bid stabilization over the ten rounds and provides a corrective mechanism to assist
participants in understanding the experiment (Shogren et al. 1994; Dickinson and Bailey 2002).
At the end of the tenth round, a random draw was used to determine which of the simultaneous
sandwich auctions and which round of bidding would be binding. The highest bidder for the
randomly selected sandwich and round paid the second highest bid price and exchanged their
sandwich for the auction sandwich. Only one sandwich was auctioned off in each experiment.
There was an equal chance that any of the rounds of bidding would be binding; thus participants
had an incentive to bid honestly each time. Following the bidding exercise participants com-
pleted a short questionnaire, collecting demographic information and additional data on atti-
tudes towards food safety risks and animal welfare issues, and the credibility of quality
assurances from different sources. The questionnaire is included in Appendix C. The following
sections will present information on the stated importance of food safety issues to the partici-
pants. The subsequent regression analysis of the WTP bids draws on these consumer attitudinal




















Food safety awareness and concern
The post-bidding survey questions
revealed that Ontario respondents
tended to be more sensitive to food
safety issues – a larger proportion having
experienced foodborne illness within
their families and a larger proportion
having altered their food purchases in
responses to media articles about food-
borne illness (Figure 1). In general, most
respondents were reasonably confident
in the Federal government’s food inspec-
tion and safety program, with the level of
self-reported confidence slightly higher
in Saskatchewan, as can be seen in
Figure 2.
Food safety, traceability and 
production method assurances
Respondents were asked whether they
would value additional assurances about
meat safety, on-farm production meth-
ods and traceability to the farm of origin.
A higher proportion of Ontario consum-
ers stated that they would highly value
additional assurances about meat safety
and on-farm production assurances com-
pared to those in Saskatchewan. A
minority also said they would highly
value traceability to the farm of origin
(Figures 3-5). In general, people indi-
cated that assurances about specific cre-
dence attributes, such as food safety and
on-farm production methods, were more
valuable to them than simple traceability.
If the respondent indicated that they val-
ued information on the procedures and
processes used by the farmer to produce
the animal, an additional question asked
for the reason. Fifty eight percent of
those responding to this question indi-
cated that they wanted more confidence
about the safety and/or quality of the
meat they purchased. Twenty percent
indicated that they wanted to be able to
identify the source of a problem should
one arise, and 12 percent provided their 
Figure 2: Confidence in Canadian food safety and 
inspection system
Figure 3: Value of food safety assurances
Figure 1: Effect on food purchases of media reports 
about foodborne diseases
Have recent media reports about foodborne diseases
(e.g. mad-cow disease, foot and mouth disease, etc.)



























1 = Great effect
3 = Some effect
5 = No effect
1 = Great effect
3 = Some effect
5 = No effect
How much confidence do you place
in the Canadian government's
































Would you value having additional assurances,
beyond what is currently provided by the


























1 = High value
3 = Some value
5 = No value
1 = High value
3 = Some value










own reason, most of these indicating ani-
mal welfare or knowledge about how the
animal was raised and what it was fed.
Participants were asked to indicate
which sources they most trusted and
least trusted to provide information
about on-farm production methods. Pos-
sible answers included various levels of
industry: producer associations
6, proces-
sors and retailers; government: Federal
7
and Provincial; and third parties: animal
welfare or environmental groups
8,
independent quality assurance firms, or
other sources specified by the
participant.  Figures 6 and 7 compare the
results for Saskatchewan and Ontario for
the most trusted and least trusted
sources respectively.
In both provinces, a Federal government
agency was the most trusted by partici-
pants, some of whom indicated that they
believed the Federal government was
more likely to protect the interests of con-
sumers, although the level of trust was
higher in Ontario than in Saskatchewan.
An independent quality assurance firm
was the most trusted source for over
20 percent of respondents in both
Ontario and Saskatchewan. There
appeared to be some scepticism of ani-
mal welfare or environmental groups
(such as Greenpeace or PETA) among
participants in Saskatchewan (least
trusted source for 37 percent of respond-
ents). Results for Ontario were mixed,
16 percent of respondents listed these
groups as their least trusted source, but
11 percent named animal welfare or
environmental groups as the most
trusted information source. Some
respondents commented that they did
not trust these groups as an objective
source of information since they were
seen to have an agenda.
Figure 5: Value of traceability to farm of origin
Figure 6: Sources most trusted to provide information 
on production practices
Figure 4: Value of on-farm production assurances
Would you value knowing the procedures and processes used 
by the farmer to produce the animal
for the meat you consume?
(e.g. treatment of animals, food and medications used,

























1 = High value
3 = Some value
5 = No value
1 = High value
3 = Some value
5 = No value
Would you value knowing the exact farm that produced the 

























1 = High value
3 = Some value
5 = No value
1 = High value
3 = Some value
5 = No value
Sources most trusted to provide information about
on-farm production practices
































Another striking difference is the trust in
the respective provincial governments,
with 8 percent of Saskatchewan respond-
ents listing the provincial government as
the most credible source of information,
whereas 7 percent of Ontario respond-
ents regarded their provincial govern-
ment as the least trusted source. One
Ontario participant referred to the
budget cutbacks of the Progressive Con-
servative government as the reason for
their distrust. One might also speculate
that the lower level of trust could be a
residual reaction to the outbreak of E. coli
contamination of the municipal water
supply in Walkerton in 1999 that resulted
in seven deaths. Without more informa-
tion, however, it is not possible to provide a clear interpretation of this difference between the
two provinces.
Interestingly, downstream food firms did not engender a great deal of trust among the respond-
ents. Food processors were regarded as the least trusted source of information by 34 percent and
18 percent of Ontario and Saskatchewan respondents respectively, while food retailers were the
least trusted source for 18 percent of respondents in both provinces. Comments from some peo-
ple revealed that these sources were perceived as having a vested commercial interest that might
give them an incentive to mislead consumers. Paradoxically, these members of the supply chain
are in the best position to communicate directly with consumers, indicating a potential credibil-
ity problem for industry sources in providing traceability and quality assurances. Cooperation
along the supply chain will be necessary to facilitate credible quality assurances about on-farm
production methods. Building individual branding and product assurances onto a nationally
accredited identification and quality verification system, as in the Australia meat industry, could
offer a solution.
Are consumers willing to pay for traceability?
Before presenting a regression analysis of the experimental auction WTP data, it is useful to con-
sider the average bid information for each sandwich and highlight any differences between the
two locations. The participant’s average bid for each sandwich in the last five rounds of bidding
is used as the dependent variable in the regression analysis that follows. Following Dickinson
and Bailey (2002), data for the dependent variable is restricted to the last five rounds of bidding
on the assumption that the bids will have stabilized around a participant’s true marginal WTP
for the attribute in question. Any bidding errors due to participants’ misunderstanding of the
auction process during the first few rounds of bidding will therefore not contaminate the data.
6. The Canadian Cattlemen’s Association or the Canadian Pork Council, as appropriate, were given as examples 
7. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada were given as examples.
8. Greenpeace and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) were given as examples.
Figure 7: Sources least trusted to provide information 
on production practices
Sources least trusted to provide information 
on production practices






















Average bid information for each sand-
wich across the full ten rounds is pre-
sented in Figures 8 and 9. Marginal bid
information is presented as a percentage
of the base sandwich value of C$2.82 for
the beef sandwich and C$2.85 for the
ham sandwich. The base sandwich value
was calculated by asking respondents
how much they would typically expect to
pay for the type of sandwich provided to
them in the experiment, and averaging
these responses. For both ham and beef,
the figures indicate that traceability to
the farm of origin, without additional
quality assurances, elicited the lowest
average WTP. Quality verification with
respect to credence attributes such as an
additional food safety assurance or an
animal welfare assurance elicited higher
bids on average. Bundling traceability
information with positive quality assur-
ances yielded the highest bids. Consist-
ent with results obtained from a similar
WTP study with U.S. consumers (Dickin-
son and Bailey, 2002), there was a
decreasing marginal WTP for the
attributes. Thus, the average bid for the
“all inclusive” sandwich was less than
the sum of bids for the individual
attributes.
Some important caveats accompany the
interpretation of this bid data. These
average values mask considerable varia-
tions in bids across participants. For example, there were a high number of zero bids for the
traceability only sandwich. Forty six percent of participants bid zero for the traceability only
sandwiches (beef and ham) during the last five rounds of bidding, when bids can be expected to
have stabilized. This compares with 27 percent who bid zero on the sandwich with the humane
animal treatment assurance, and 17 percent who bid zero on the sandwich with the additional
food safety assurance. Only 7 percent of participants bid zero on the fourth sandwich that com-
bined traceability with an extra food safety assurance and animal welfare assurance. Due to the
nature of a one day experiment, the bid information is usually considered to be an upper bound
on WTP (Dickinson and Bailey, 2002; Hayes et al, 1995). Caution should be exercised in extrapo-
lating these WTP bids into other contexts. Budget constraints typically limit WTP. Differences in
perceived food safety risks across products could also affect consumers’ WTP for safety assur-
ances depending on the product in question.
Regression analysis enables a more extensive assessment of the factors affecting the WTP for
traceability and quality assurances in meat. The dependent variable in the regression analysis is
the average of the final five rounds of bidding for each sandwich for a given subject. Figures 8
Figure 8: Average willingness-to-pay bids: beef 
experiments
Figure 9: Average willingness-to-pay bids: pork 
experiments
Average WTP bids – pork
N=100





















































Average WTP bids – beef
N=104









































































and 9 confirm that there may be a learning process during the early rounds. Bids tended to stabi-
lize after about the third or fourth round of bidding, by which time each subject probably real-
ized that the rational strategy was to bid their true WTP. The independent variables for the
regression analysis are listed in Table 2, along with details on the measurement of the variable
and, where appropriate, a priori expectations regarding the sign of the coefficient.
Four demographic variables are included: gender, age, education and income level. There are no
a priori expectations regarding the effect of these variables on the bids for the four sandwiches,
with the possible exception of income where there is a weak expectation of a positive income
effect if higher income individuals are less constrained by a budget constraint. However, it






GENDER Gender Male = 1; Female = 0- ?
AGE Age Age in years ?




INCOME Annual household income 1=<$30,000; 2=$30,000-$60,000; 
3=$60,000-$90,000; 4=>$90,000
+?
LOCATION Location of panel  1=Saskatchewan 0=Ontario ?
FPOISON Subject or family member experienced 
food poisoning
1=Yes, 0=No +
ARTICLES News articles/reports read/heard regard-
ing foodborne disease in last 6 months
Number of articles/reports +?
MEDIA Effect of media reports about foodborne 
diseases (e.g. BSE, foot and mouth dis-
ease) on food purchases
Score 1-5, where 1 = great effect 
and 5 = no effect
-
CONFSAFE Confidence in Canadian food inspection 
and safety program
Score 1-5, where 1 = complete 
confidence and 
5 = no confidence
+
VALUESAFE Value additional assurances about meat 
safety 
Score 1-5, where 1 = highly 
value and 5 = no value
-
VALUETRACE Value knowing exact farm that produced 
the animal
Score 1-5, where 1 = highly 
value and 5 = no value
-
VALUEPROCESS Value knowing processes used by farmer 
to produce the animal
Score 1-5, where 1 = highly 
value and 5 = no value
-
HUMANETREAT Sandwich #1: Humane animal treatment 
assurances
Dummy variable: 
1 = Sandwich #1
+
MEATSAFETY Sandwich #2: Additional food safety 
assurances
Dummy Variable: 
1 = Sandwich #2
+
ALLATTRIBS Sandwich #4: Traceability plus food 
safety & humane animal treatment assur-
ances
Dummy variable: 
1 = Sandwich #4
+
AVEMKTP Market price from first five rounds Average of announced market 
price from first five rounds










should be emphasized that the bids were for the marginal difference in valuation of the extra
information in the sandwiches – not the whole value of the sandwich – and that each participant
was provided with an equal income endowment (C$20) at the start of the experiment. A budget
constraint may not be relevant in this case, hence there is only a weak expectation for a positive
coefficient for the income variable. A dummy variable (LOCATION) was included to control for
the location of the panel – Saskatchewan or Ontario. This serves to isolate any location-specific
effects yielding bid differences between the provinces.
Four variables measure consumer awareness and concerns over food safety issues: direct experi-
ence with food poisoning (FPOISON), exposure to media coverage of food safety issues (ARTI-
CLES), the effect of media reports about foodborne disease on food purchase decisions (MEDIA)
and the level of confidence in the current Canadian government food inspection and safety pro-
gram (CONFSAFE). It is expected that experience with food poisoning would induce people to
pay more for additional food safety assurances, although not necessarily for increased traceabil-
ity or humane animal treatment assurances. Exposure to media stories on foodborne diseases
would have a positive effect on WTP, assuming that those media stories are negative. The survey
data did not allow us to determine whether the media reports were positive or negative, how-
ever, if we assume that the negative foodborne disease stories are more newsworthy, we would
expect this variable to have a positive coefficient.
An alternative interpretation, however, might be that more informed consumers are less con-
cerned about food safety, and therefore a negative coefficient would be appropriate. An alterna-
tive measure is given by the variable MEDIA, which asks whether reports about foodborne
diseases have affected food purchase decisions. ARTICLES and MEDIA will not be used together
in the regression analysis as there is a reasonable expectation that they could be correlated –
higher exposure to media articles about foodborne diseases might affect food purchases. The
coefficient on MEDIA is expected to be negative given the specification of the variable, where
lower levels of the independent variable correspond to a greater effect of media reports on food
purchases. A lower level of confidence in the current food inspection and safety program is rep-
resented by a higher score for the variable CONFSAFE. The variable is expected to have a posi-
tive coefficient, reflecting a higher WTP for stronger safety and quality assurances than are
currently available from the existing food safety inspection system.
Three variables are used to measure the stated value respondents’ placed on additional assur-
ances about meat safety (VALUESAFE), traceability (VALUETRACE) and on-farm production
methods (VALUEPROCESS). These variables are included as a validity check on the stated pref-
erence and experimental auction bidding process. We should expect a correlation between the
value people say they place on extra assurances of food safety, traceability and animal welfare
and the amount they were actually willing to bid on food which include these additional assur-
ances. Given the specification of these variables, where a higher rating means the assurance had
less value to the respondent, we expect these coefficients to be negative.
Three dummy variables are used to represent the different sandwich types: extra food safety
(MEATSAFETY), animal welfare (HUMANETREAT) and combined traceability, food safety and
animal welfare assurances (ALLATTRIBS). Sandwich #3, with a traceability assurance, is the ref-
erence category. Coefficients on these dummy variables will indicate whether respondents were
willing to pay a premium over basic traceability for the sandwiches that offered information on
specific credence attributes. Given the economic functions of a traceability system outlined ear-




















asymmetry with respect to credence attributes relative to a simple ex post traceability assurance.
We expect positive coefficients for the three sandwich dummy variables.
The final independent variable, AVEMKTP, measures the announced average market price dur-
ing the first five rounds of bidding. This is included to capture any market feedback effects from
the announced market price, which may indicate strategic bidding on the part of the auction par-
ticipants. The market price variable is based on the first five rounds of bid data whereas the
dependent variable is based on the last five rounds of bid data to ensure that the market price is
exogenously determined with respect to the dependent variable. This variable is included to sep-
arate out any potential market feedback effects, and as such, there are no a priori expectations for
the sign of the coefficient.
Separate regressions were run for the pork and beef data. The model treats each individual as a
cross sectional unit in the panel data set, as there were bids on four separate sandwich types for
each of many individuals. The bids across sandwiches for each individual are treated as a time
series data set (Dickinson and Bailey, 2002). This procedure allows a more accurate assessment of
the bid for each sandwich type.
Table 3 reports pooled least squares estimates of the average bids for pork and beef. The num-




In the beef model, ARTICLES, LOCATION, VALUESAFE, VALUEPROCESS and the three sand-
wich coefficients, MEATSAFETY, HUMANETREAT and ALLATTRIBS were all highly signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Signs were commensurate with a priori expectations, with the exception of
ARTICLES with a negative coefficient, the implications of which will be discussed below. The
coefficients for the three sandwich dummy variables indicate that a beef sandwich with an extra
food safety assurance might command a $0.33 marginal premium relative to one with only a
traceability guarantee. Beef with humane animal treatment assurances had on average a $0.27
premium over beef that was traceable. Bundling traceability with both quality assurances
yielded an $0.83 premium over the traceability-only sandwich
10.
The positive and highly significant coefficient on LOCATION implies that Saskatchewan
respondents were willing to pay, on average, $0.29 more to exchange their sandwich with one
that had additional verifiable characteristics relative to the Ontario respondents. Results for the
variables VALUESAFE and VALUEPROCESS suggest that people who said they placed more
value in additional food safety and production method assurances were actually willing to pay
more for beef products with additional assurances.
9. Thus if P-value < level of significance, α, we reject the hypothesis. If p-value > level of significance, α, we fail to reject the
hypothesis. For example, a p-value of 0.00 indicates that the variable is significant at all values of α, whereas a p-value of 0.05
indicates that the variable is significant at the 5% confidence level, a p-value of 0.09 (or 0.10) indicates that the variable is
significant at the 10% confidence level, etc.
10. As a percentage of the base sandwich value, $2.82, these premiums are 11% for an extra food safety assurances, 9.5% for an










The negative coefficient for ARTICLES indicates that the more news articles about foodborne
diseases individuals had read in the previous six months, the lower their bids for the sandwiches
with the verifiable information. This is surprising and perhaps indicates that media articles on
these subjects have served to reassure Canadians about food safety and quality assurance
attributes in their food. Using the same model but substituting the variable MEDIA for ARTI-
CLES resulted in a coefficient that was not statistically significant and had the wrong sign, thus
ARTICLES seems to be a more appropriate variable.
























































































The two other variables measuring food safety awareness and concern (FPOISON and CONF-
SAFE) were significant at the 25% level. Food poisoning experience tended to increase WTP, as
expected. Lower levels of confidence in the current food safety and inspection system tended to
increase WTP
11 as hypothesized. The coefficient for average market price was positive but statis-
tically insignificant at the 5% and 10% levels, although was significant at the 25% level. There
may be only limited market feedback effects in the beef data. Dickinson and Bailey (2002) sug-
gest that it is not important whether this represents strategic bidding, instead the variable iso-
lates this effect so that the remaining coefficient estimators are unbiased. The four demographic
variables, AGE, GENDER, EDUCATION, INCOME were not statistically significant.
Pork results
The pork model yielded mixed results, some of which differ from the beef model. Attitudes
towards food safety, quality assurances and traceability can be expected to vary among products
depending on food safety risk perceptions, animal welfare images of the sector, etc. All three
sandwich dummy variables had the expected sign. The coefficient for the fourth sandwich, trace-
ability bundled with food safety and production method assurances (ALLATRIBS), was highly
significant at the 1% level, indicating an increased WTP of $0.28 on average for this sandwich
over the traceability-only sandwich. The coefficient for the sandwich with the humane animal
treatment assurance was significant at the 10% level, and suggests a $0.13 premium over the
traceable-only sandwich
12. The coefficient on the sandwich with the additional food safety
assurance (MEATSAFETY) indicates a $0.09 premium over the traceable sandwich but this
coefficient was only significant at the 25% confidence level; this result should be interpreted with
caution.
The variable VALUETRACE had the expected sign and was significant at the 5% level, indicating
that respondents who stated that they would value knowing the exact farm that produced the
animals for the meat they consumed were willing to bid more for the traceable sandwich. The
variables VALUEPROCESS and VALUESAFE had the correct signs but were not significant at
the 5% and 10% levels but did become significant if the confidence level was raised to 25%.
Results for the food safety awareness and concern variables were mixed. Lower levels of confi-
dence in the meat safety and inspection system yielded lower, rather than higher WTP bids for
the pork sandwiches, contrary to expectations, and the coefficient was significant at the 5% level.
Similarly, the incidence of food poisoning tended to result in lower, rather than higher bids in
the pork model, at a 10% confidence level. The number of articles or media reports dealing with
foodborne diseases tended to increase WTP, as expected, but this was only significant at the 25%
level. These results suggest that the food safety issues were less important or there was less
awareness of these issues for pork compared to beef. Age, gender and income levels did not
affect WTP, and education was only significant at the 25% (19%) level, wherein higher levels of
education increased WTP. Unlike the beef model, there was no statistical difference in the bids
between respondents in Ontario and Saskatchewan.
11. As indicated earlier, this is represented by higher values of the categorical variable CONFSAFE.
12. As a percentage of the base sandwich value of $2.85, this represents a 4.6 percent premium over the traceable ham sandwich,
compared with 9.8 percent for the sandwich with all three attributes.Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector 31
C HAPTER 6
C ONCLUSION
The results of the experimental auctions suggest that respondents were willing to pay non-trivial
amounts for a traceability assurance, although these results are stronger for beef than for pork.
However, quality assurances with respect to food safety and on-farm production methods for
beef were more valuable to consumers than a simple traceability assurance. Combining traceabil-
ity with these additional assurances yielded significantly more value to consumers than tracea-
bility alone. The economic value of the specific combination of traceability and quality
assurances evaluated in this research appeared to be higher for beef ($0.83) than for pork ($0.28).
This may reflect more media attention and therefore a heightened consumer awareness to food
safety issues with respect to beef in general, such as problems with BSE and E.Coli.
The regression results support first impressions from a casual observation of the bid data and are
consistent with the different economic functions of a traceability system discussed in this report.
While traceability is clearly of some value to some consumers, traceability, by itself, may not be
enough and does not address the issue of consumer information asymmetry with respect to cre-
dence quality attributes. Traceability bundled with quality assurances with respect to specific
credence attributes has more appeal. This is consistent with results obtained in a comparable
study of U.S. consumers (Dickinson and Bailey, 2002). Ex post reactive traceability systems can of
course perform important economic functions in limiting the costs from a food safety problem
and in maintaining consumer confidence in an industry, however, they do little to reduce con-
sumer information asymmetry. Traceability may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for
ex ante verification of quality attributes.
The development of private sector traceability systems in meat supply chains is primarily driven
by cost and risk reduction motivations. Traceability systems can also facilitate ex ante quality
assurances, but they do not necessarily always provide consumers with this additional informa-
tion. Although some Canadian consumers indicated a WTP for a simple traceability assurance
particularly for beef, the results of the consumer research suggest that combining traceability
with other quality assurances about farm production or processing methods may be a more via-
ble product differentiation strategy in the Canadian red meat sector. To be effective as a product
differentiation strategy, however, these quality assurances need to be credible. Participants in the
consumer panels indicated relatively high levels of trust in public sector assurances about pro-
duction methods relative to those from the private sector. The question of credible quality sig-
nals in the food industry is an important topic for further research.
Finally, a key question is what do we really mean by traceability? While there has been much
discussion of traceability, there has been relatively little analysis of the economic benefits and
costs of different traceability systems and assessments of whether these systems will achieve










an important question. Clearly, the answer depends on the degree to which market failure exists
and, therefore, the extent of the information asymmetry problem. Traceability systems are evolv-
ing rapidly in meat and livestock sectors in different countries. In many cases basic livestock
traceability has been mandated or is enforced through regulatory agencies. Traceability beyond
the point of slaughter, however, remains by and large the purview of the private sector, with the
exception of the EU beef labelling regulation. Although the EU regulation at first glance appears
to be consumer-driven, in fact, it does not provide additional information for consumers on cre-
dence attributes – it is simply a means to trace beef products through the supply chain should a
problem arise.
The economic model and empirical analysis presented in this report suggest that the notion of
simple livestock traceback systems as a means to reduce consumers’ information asymmetry is
misguided. While ex post reactive traceability systems have an important role in limiting the
extent of food safety outbreaks and in maintaining consumer confidence in an industry, they do
little to reduce the ex ante information problem. If the objective is to reduce consumer informa-
tion asymmetry with respect to quality assurances, traceability may be the wrong word to apply.
It implies an ex post reactive process of tracing something to the source of origin, rather than ex
ante provision of information on process attributes that verifies product quality. The research
conducted for this report indicates that Canadian consumers are likely to place a higher value on
quality verification systems in which traceability facilitates the provision of additional quality
assurances than on traceability alone. Future economic analysis of the role of traceability systems
in improving food safety and food quality should distinguish between ex ante information provi-
sion and ex post traceability functions.Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector 33
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The following presents a demographic analysis of the consumer panel participants by gender,
age, education and income levels. There were 98 Ontario participants and 106 from Saskatch-
ewan. Statistics are presented for the whole sample and broken down by location.
Gender
Table A1 shows that males were over-represented in Saskatchewan, whereas the Ontario sample
was more representative of the Canadian population (50.5 percent female, 49.5 percent male)
(Statistics Canada(a))
Age
The Saskatchewan sample was over represented by the younger age groups relative to the
Ontario sample. In general, older consumers were under-represented relative to the Canadian
population. Statistics Canada data indicates that 17 percent of the Canadian population are over
60, whereas 4.41 percent of the full sample were over 60 (Statistics Canada(b)).
*People had to be over 18 years of age to participate in the panels
Education
A similar proportion of respondents at both locations had high school or grade 10 as their high-
est education level. While the Saskatchewan sample was over-represented by people with a
graduate degree, a higher proportion of Ontario respondents had either some college or an
Table A1: Sample distribution by gender (%)
Gender Male Female
Full sample (n=204) 60.78% 39.22%
Ontario (n=98) 46.94% 53.06%
Saskatchewan (n=106) 73.58% 26.42%
Table A2: Sample distribution by age (%)
Age 18-25* 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 >65
Full sample (n=204) 19.61% 24.02% 25.98% 20.10% 8.82% 1.47%
Ontario (n=98) 8.16% 28.57% 27.55% 23.47% 12.24% 0.00%












undergraduate degree. Relative to the Canadian population, the sample has higher education
levels. This probably reflects the locations chosen for the study – both Saskatoon and Guelph are
university towns, and of course the Saskatchewan sample was drawn from the university popu-
lation, albeit from a cross-section of employees (faculty, maintenance and administrative staff)
and students. Thirty three percent of the Saskatchewan sample were students, compared with
12 percent in Ontario.
Income
The higher proportion of Saskatchewan respondents in the lower income category probably
reflects the fact that there were more students in this sample, although it more closely reflects
Canadian income distribution. A higher proportion of the Ontario sample instead fell into the
$60,000 to $90,000 income range.







Full sample (n=204) 24.02% 35.29% 20.59% 20.10%
Ontario (n=98) 22.45% 44.9% 23.47% 9.18%
Saskatchewan (n=106) 25.47% 26.46% 17.92% 30.19%
Table A4: Sample distribution by annual household income (%)
Income <$30K $30K-$60K $60K-$90K >$90K
Full sample (n=204) 25.98% 27.45% 25.98% 20.59%
Ontario (n=98) 17.35% 28.57% 32.65% 21.43%
Saskatchewan (n=106) 33.96% 26.42% 19.81% 19.81%Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector 39




The following information about each sandwich was provided to participants in the experimen-
tal auctions.
BEEF
The following brief descriptions of Sandwiches #1, #2, #3, and #4 highlight the verifiable charac-
teristics of the meat in that sandwich. Such characteristics have not been certified and cannot
be verified for the meat in your current sandwich.
Sandwich #1
Information is available on certain enhanced processes and procedures used to produce the ani-
mal that provided the meat in this sandwich, and this is over and above what one would know
from typical beef products (e.g., this meat product has extra assurances that the animal was
raised in a state-of-the-art facility, the animal was fed high quality feed and was processed in a
low-stress environment—this is part of humane animal treatment)
Sandwich #2
We know that the meat for this sandwich was processed in a plant federally inspected by the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (not all Canadian meat plants are Federally inspected). We
also know that the processing plant follows a food safety hazard minimization certification pro-
gram that not all Canadian meat plants follow, even if they are Federally inspected.
Sandwich #3
The meat in this sandwich can be traced back to the specific farm on which the animal was
raised.
Sandwich #4
The meat in this sandwich can be traced back to the specific farm in which the animal was raised.
In addition: (1) Information is available on certain enhanced processes and procedures used to
produce the animal that provided the meat in this sandwich, and this is over and above what one
would know from typical beef products (e.g. this meat product has extra assurances that the ani-
mal was raised in a state-of-the-art facility, the animal was fed high quality feed and was proc-
essed in a low-stress environment—this is part of humane animal treatment and (2) The meat for












Agency (not all Canadian meat plants are Federally inspected). We also know that the processing
plant follows a food safety hazard minimization certification program that not all Canadian meat
plants follow, even if they are Federally inspected.
PORK
The following brief descriptions of Sandwiches #1, #2, #3, and #4 highlight the verifiable charac-
teristics of the meat in that sandwich. Such characteristics have not been certified and cannot
be verified for the meat in your current sandwich.
Sandwich #1
Certified information is available on certain enhanced processes and procedures used to produce
the animal that provided the meat in this sandwich (e.g., this meat product has extra assurances
of animal well-being and high health status of the animals—this is part of humane animal treat-
ment, including standards that exceed the Canadian pork industry’s Canadian Quality Assur-
ance Program)
Sandwich #2
The plant that processed this meat conducts additional food safety testing (over and above the
industry standard) and its ham exceeds the Canadian industry standard for (microbiological)
food safety.
Sandwich #3
The meat in this sandwich can be traced back to the farm on which the animal was produced
(i.e., we can identify the farm that produced the animal).
Sandwich #4
The meat in this sandwich can be traced back to the farm on which the animal was produced
(i.e., we can identify the farm that produced the animal). In addition: (1) Certified information is
available on certain enhanced processes and procedures used to produce the animal that pro-
vided the meat in this sandwich (e.g., this meat product has extra assurances of animal well-
being and high health status of the animals—this is part of humane animal treatment, including
standards that exceed the Canadian pork industry’s Canadian Quality Assurance Program) and
(2) The plant that processed this meat conducts additional food safety testing (over and above
the industry standard) and its ham exceeds the Canadian industry standard for (microbiological)
food safety.Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector 41
QUESTIONNAIRE
Are you:  male female Are you:  married single divorced
What is your age?: How many children do you have?:




Other (if so, please describe)
Who typically makes most decisions about food purchases in your household?: You Someone else
What is you current employment status? Employed hours a week, $ per hour in pay
OR
hours a month, $ per month in pay
Unemployed
Are you a student? Yes No







Have you or any member of your family had food poisoning? Yes No
If YES, did it require medical attention? Yes No
Have recent media report about foodborne diseases
(e.g., mad-cow disease, foot and mouth disease, etc.) 
affected your food purchases?
Circle one of the following
12345
great effect some effect no effect
What is your best estimate of the number of news articles or reports that you have read or heard about on foodborne 
diseases in the last 6 months?
How much confidence do you place in the Canadian
government’s current food inspection and safety pro-
gram?




A PPENDIX  C












Do you belong to any organization whose stated goals 
are to protect the environment and/or protect animals? Yes No
Would you value having additional assurances, beyond 
what is currently provided by the Canadian government, 
about meat safety?
Circle one of the following
12345
highly some no value
value value at all
Would you value knowing the exact farm that produced 
the animals for the meat you consume?
Circle one of the following
12345
highly some no value
value value at all
Would you value knowing the procedures and processes 
used by the farmer to produce the animal for the meat you 
consume (e.g., treatment of animals, foods and medica-
tions used, presence or absence genetically modified 
organisms, etc.)?
Circle one of the following
12345
highly some no value
value value at all
If you value the information from question 17,
is it because:
Circle one of the following
a) You want more confidence about safety and/or quality 
of the meat you purchase
b) You want to be able to identify the source of the prob-
lem, should one arise
c) Other (please describe)
Which source would you most and least trust to provide the information from question 17?
To provide this information I would most (least) trust:
Please circle your
most (only one) and Comments (why would you
least (only one) trusted most or least trust the source)
1) The Canadian government (Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency or Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada)
2) The provincial government
3) A beef industry association (Canadian Cattlemen’s 
Association)
a
4) The company that processed and packaged the meat
5) The retailer where I buy the meat
6) An animal welfare group or environmental (PETA - Peo-
ple for the Ethical Treatment of Animals or Greenpeace)
7) An independent quality assurance firm
8) Other (please specify)










What would you normally pay for a meat sandwich
similar to the one you were given at the start of the experiment
(not the auction sandwiches, but your original one)?
Where would you buy such a sandwich? (that is, what type of store specifically)
a. For the pork questionnaire, this category read “A pork industry association (e.g. Canadian Pork Council)”
QUESTIONNAIRE
Please just enter your estimate
of the value of the original sandwich,
not the value of the entire lunch